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This paper sets out an argument that cyber-security needs to be thought of as an inherently socio-
technical challenge where people are the source both 
of the strongest threat and countermeasure. I draw 
on experience researching cyber- and information 
warfare and consult onboard and operational tests 
of responses to such attacks. I am also fortunate to 
be part of an energetic and unconventional cluster 
of theorists (the CORTEX group) looking at cyber 
and related risks from the viewpoint of being both 
practitioners and academics. Our belief is that many 
thinking about and working in cybersecurity suffer as 
a result of minimising the consideration of the human 
factor. Organisations which embrace a broader view 
of what cyber-security is could enjoy a competitive 
advantage in terms of situational awareness, risk 
mitigation and crisis response denied to those who 
cleave to a technologically-weighted definition. This 
chapter sets out some ideas to stimulate debate – 
how can organisations evolve efficient and effective 
counter-measures to the human dimension of 
cyber-security?
Fundamentally, cyber-security is about protecting 
the ability of an organisation to make decisions 
and continue the delivery of strategic objectives. If 
vital databases are inaccessible, core Intellectual 
Property (IP) stolen, trust and confidence lost, private 
conversations made public, asset registers corrupted, 
prospects missed, an organisation will be unable to 
continue with its normal course of business, generate 
options and make choices on its own terms, against its 
own priorities and determine its normal time horizons. 
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The usual decision-making cycle is impossible as a 
crisis of potentially existential proportions has erupted. 
Otherwise rational decision-makers lose their heads, 
find themselves obsessed with tactical detail rather 
than the strategic picture and become driven by media 
coverage rather than business requirements. Freedom 
of manoeuvre is reduced to almost nothing, with the 
tempo and pace of activity set by the ensuring crisis. 
There are few upside opportunities and an awful lot of 
downside risks and costs.
Even if nothing has happened, the perception 
that something has is corrosive to upstream trust: 
great reassurance is needed for many stakeholders, 
where, sometimes, reassurance will be impossible. 
McKinsey and Co. evidence this in reporting one of 
their client’s unfortunate direct costs in dealing with a 
cyber-incident, some $100m. However, “those costs 
were small compared with the subsequent multibillion-
dollar loss in market capitalisation, which was largely 
attributed to investors’ 
loss of confidence in 
the company’s ability to 
respond” (McKinsey & Co, 
2013). 
Although some cyber-
security exploits are deeply 
subtle and clever – many 
are not – when expensive 
and smart measures are put 
in place they can often be made irrelevant by simple 
behavioural realities. A specialist law enforcement 
officer told me of a simple experiment outside a bank 
data centre: 100 individuals passed and spotted a 
‘mislaid’ USB data-stick in the car park; all 100 picked 
it up with the intention of satisfying their basic human 
curiosity as to its contents.
However, caution needs to be adopted in thinking 
that examples such as these are the limit of the extent 
of socio-technical risk. Such problematic reactions and 
underpinning assessments of risk are not far along a 
continuum which (we must anticipate) will conclude with 
extremely sophisticated attack vectors and techniques. 
Therefore, there is a pressing need to develop 
immunity to pretty basic attempts to subvert technical 
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security measures and conventional user monitoring. 
It would be unwise for companies and governments 
to assume that what they are aware of or experience 
at the moment is the worst ‘cyber-threat weather’ that 
can be encountered. Of course, it is worth noting that 
surveys indicate that the existing entry-level threats 
consistently penetrate existing protective measures, 
for example. The 2014 Information Breaches Survey 
found that 81% of large and 60% of small businesses 
detected security breaches (Business Innovation 
& Skills, 2014), and yet these could be thought of 
as the ‘GCSEs of cyber-attack’ as the then Cabinet 
Secretary Gus O’Donnell once described my exercise 
of the crisis machinery facility COBR against an 
analogous scenario!
In running extensive exercises of boards and 
operational responses to cyber-challenges, my 
experience has been that organisations struggle to 
reach an understanding of (a) the potential of cyber-
security risks in general 
(b) the implications for the 
delivery of business and 
(c) of the ways in which an 
unfolding situation could 
have, or be early signs of, a 
cyber-dimension. Because 
cyber-risks are so poorly 
understood and have 
largely become thought of as 
owned by jargonised, technologically-based experts, 
boards and others barely grasp their significance in the 
abstract, non-crisis context and certainly cannot reach 
a swift understanding under the stress of an incident. 
Here is a brief insight into just how poorly 
organisations conceptualise cyber-security: employees 
are being suspended, subject to disciplinary 
investigation and (likely) dismissed on the basis 
of physical copies of alleged digital evidence. For 
example, in human resources and other functions of 
organisations, there is no awareness that it is possible 
to completely fake WhatsApp and other messaging 
exchanges. Faking at the digital level is one thing: 
but this is merely the generation of what appear to be 
exchanges – but printed out. In receipt of such paper 
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‘evidence’, organisations should, of course, request 
copies of, be able to handle or commission professional 
digital forensic analysis. Instead, the paper ‘evidence’ 
is accepted as prima facie proof that something needs 
investigation at the level of the employee(s) implicated 
– rather than actually shielding the employee and 
the organisation from stress, cost and distraction by 
requiring the supply of authenticated materials. It is 
so simple to download emulators of the WhatsApp 
user interface and edit every detail that without digital 
evidence (or by requiring that alleged criminality is 
reported to the law enforcement community rather than 
the employer) such print-outs of alleged screenshots 
should be viewed as works of art and nothing more. 
It is becoming clear that organisations accept 
such emulated product and launch immediate and 
heavy-handed disciplinary proceedings – safe in the 
knowledge that they can likely dismiss an employee 
on the grounds of this ‘evidence’ because they have 
a reasonable belief that it is genuine. Whilst this 
may be legally safe, it is not helpful for the business 
or institution, which stands to lose talent, as well as 
the intangibles such as trust, confidence and goodwill 
amongst remaining employees, due to entirely faked 
and easily refuted artefacts. 
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In short, at board level and elsewhere in 
organisations, cyber-security is restrictively thought of 
as being about electronic attack conducted through the 
medium of malicious software and hacking – directed 
against firewalls and other security infrastructure. 
When cyber-scenarios are considered, they are usually 
addressed in terms of how the company would restore 
availability and assure integrity of systems separate to 
managing the wider business consequences. So, for 
example, managing a disastrous failure of a key server 
and its dependant applications would be explored in 
isolation from the multitude of direct business effects 
and additional work (e.g., client liaison, investor 
reassurance, press and PR activities) generated.
This underscores an easy mental separation that 
has become accepted as normal. The scope of cyber-, 
the likely shape and characteristics of a cyber-threat 
and the business impacts. This has produced a 
dangerous and skewed perception, which is both 
limited and limiting.
Counter-measures to cyber-risks are generally 
neatly compartmentalised as being about having 
the best (value) firewalls and other systems, with 
personnel mandated to change passwords and adhere 
to basic information security protocols. These topics are 
of little interest to boards where technical knowledge 
is limited and, even where there is a Chief Information 
Officer (CIO) or Chief Information Security Officer 
(CISO) in the C-suite, they struggle to win resources or 
attention arising from even a narrowly defined version of 
cyber-security. 
Just as the saying goes ‘good information warfare 
is indistinguishable from bad administration’, so the 
potential of clever socio-technical attack is that the pre-
placement or recruitment of employees, etc., would be 
indistinguishable from the normal ‘noise’ and chaos that 
characterises the modern workplace. Indeed, even as 
individuals move organically (e.g., if motivated by their 
own personal beefs or malevolence) or strategically 
(e.g., guided by an activist 
group, industrial competitor 
or hostile intelligence 
service) towards causing 
or enabling the causation 
of cyber-compromise, 
the likelihood of detection 
by existing sensors is 
vanishingly small.
To further complicate 
matters, we in the CORTEX 
group believe that cyber-
security (as a socio-
technical phenomenon) 
should also encompass 
even less technical 
events – but events which 
nonetheless depend on cyber-infrastructure. In a 
forthcoming conference presentation, my colleague 
Guy Batchelor and I will reflect on the lessons that 
ought to be learned by any public or private sector 
organisation by the fall from grace of Brooks Newmark 
MP (and former Junior Minister) as well as that of Sir 
Malcolm Rifkind MP (former Chair of the Intelligence 
and Security Committee). To focus on the former, 
the very simplest form of digital tradecraft was used 
to effectively shape the situational awareness of the 
Minister of State for Civil Society.
A journalist developed a Twitter profile purporting 
to be that of a young, blonde, female Conservative 
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Party public relations staffer. Comprised with the 
bare minimum of content – but clearly just enough 
to convince at least one target of its authenticity – 
unproblematic Twitter messaging was effectively used 
to enable the migration of the online conversation 
to alternative platforms. Exchanges of photos then 
occurred, which, when ultimately released into the 
public domain, terminated Mr Newmark’s career. 
This is hardly the most sophisticated, nor novel, type 
of way of causing embarrassment to politicians or other 
middle-aged men. What is, perhaps, slightly more 
surprising is that this was so easily achieved in an ever 
more security conscious world, replete with warnings 
about the easy exploitation of social media.
And things could 
have been even worse. 
Indeed, maybe there are 
for others yet to hit the 
headlines. If it was so 
easy to detect and exploit 
a very conventional 
vulnerability in a figure 
in public life, we can 
reasonably assume that 
senior individuals in 
other walks of life may 
be just as (if not more) 
vulnerable. The effect 
sought in the Newmark 
case was clearly to 
generate business for 
a freelance journalist – but what if the effect sought 
were different?
There is no reason why Newmark, a director of 
procurement, head of security of any other senior or 
middle-ranking individual might not be targeted on 
behalf of commercial rivals or others. If, rather than 
being motivated solely by generating embarrassment 
and media coverage in the very short term, Newmark’s 
behaviour (or that of a procurement, contract, facilities 
or other director or manager) had led to their being 
retained as an asset, what might they be pressured 
to do? For example, the threat of exposure could be 
leveraged by a criminal enterprise or others to award a 
contract to an uncompetitive bidder, re-open or close a 
regulatory investigation, endorse a product or service 
by attending functions or, simply, allow access to a site 
or a system by an unknown person.
Here are some concluding thoughts. How should 
organisations react to these challenges? What 
should they do at a conceptual level to ensure that 
they become ever more resilient at the human as 
well as the technological level? Analogies are very 
useful – one of my favourites is that of an immune 
system. Organisations should feel the need to expose 
themselves to attenuated or synthetic pathogens (as 
with vaccinations) and thereby grow resistance as well 
as having a generally ‘fit’ system that is capable of 
avoiding obvious potential harms. This should include 
reacting as well as possible when a compromise does 
occur (the equivalent of infection by an unknown 
parasite, virus or bacteria). From a combination of 
enhanced sensors (to avoid), cognition (to anticipate) 
and rapid response (the reflexes) the building of 
immunity is acquired. Just as immune systems in 
bodies are protected by a perimeter (such as the skin 
and devices to prevent the ingestion of bacteria and 
virus-laden objects, such as the Vibrissae hairs of 
the nasal passages) – so the technological perimeter 
of cyber is just one of which must be an integrated, 
agile and adaptive suite of approaches to socio-
technical security.
Conceptualising the immune system idea in 
practice is no doubt challenging. However, it is a way 
of achieving higher levels of protection required in an 
ever more turbulent world where the privately owned 
critical national infrastructure may be a target for 
adversaries, and where outages are not tolerated by 
either consumers or investors. The planning for and 
response to cyber incidents must be underpinned by 
a broad definition of just what cyber can involve (i.e., 
any computer-mediated communication) in shaping, 
restricting or determining the decision-making of the 
targeted organisation and individuals. As Ernst and 
Young have recently stated: “being in a proactive 
position to anticipate and mitigate cyber threat is one 
of today’s most important business objectives” (Ernst 
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